Unblocking the Digital Economy Act 2010 : human rights issues in the UK by Romero Moreno, Felipe
This is the accepted manuscript of an article published by Taylor & 
Francis in International Review of Law, Computers and Technology 
on 21 March 2013.   
The version of record [Romero-Moreno, F. (2013) ‘Unblocking the 
Digital Economy Act 2010, human rights issues in the UK’, 
International Review of Law, Computers & Technology, 27(1-2): 18-





UNBLOCKING THE DIGITAL ECONOMY ACT 2010; HUMAN RIGHTS ISSUES IN 
THE UK  
INTRODUCTION 
Through an example of a study utilizing the case-law research method, this paper critically 
assesses whether taking into account the findings of La Rue (the United Nations Rapporteur 
on Human Rights1) website blocking could be implemented in a way which is compatible 
with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). Drawing upon, inter alia, the ‘‘Site 
Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement paper2 (hereinafter Ofcom’s review), 
sections 17 and 18 of the Digital Economy Act 2010 (DEA), namely, the power to make 
provision about injunctions preventing access to internet locations (hereinafter the site 
blocking provisions), section 97A of the Copyright Designs and Patents Act (CDPA) as well 
as some European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) and Court of Justice of the European 
Union (CJEU) jurisprudence, this study seeks to answer the question of whether the 
implementation of any blocking measure might possibly be consistent with the ECHR, in 
particular, with Article 10.  
As the ECtHR held in Times v UK: 
 
‘‘…the Internet plays an important role in enhancing the public's access to news and 
facilitating the dissemination of information generally. The maintenance of Internet archives 
is a critical aspect of this role and the Court therefore considers that such archives fall 
within the ambit of the protection afforded by Article 10.’’3 
 
According to the Special Rapporteur, there are several procedural requirements which any 
limitation to the right to freedom of expression has to follow in order to pass the three-part 
cumulative test.  
 
 First, it needs to be ‘‘prescribed by law’’ which is clear and accessible to all 
individuals (principles of predictability and transparency). 
 Second, it is required to ‘‘protect rights of others’’ (principle of legitimacy). 
                                                 
1 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La 
Rue’ (16 May 2011) Session 7th UN Doc A/HRC/17/27. 
2 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 3, accessed 2 February, 2012. 
3 Times Newspapers Ltd (Nos 1 and 2) v the United Kingdom (App nos 3002/03 and 23676/03) (2009) ECHR 451 [27]. 
 Third, it needs to be proven to be ‘‘necessary’’ and the least invasive means possible 
to achieve the specific aim (principles of necessity and proportionality).4 
 
On 1 February 2011, the UK Secretary of State for Culture, Mr Jeremy Hunt asked the 
independent regulator Ofcom to evaluate whether sections 17 and 18 of the DEA ‘‘could 
work’.5 In a crucial announcement Mr Hunt declared: 
‘‘I have no problem with the principle of blocking access to websites used exclusively for 
facilitating illegal downloading of content. But it is not clear whether the site blocking 
provisions in the Act could work in practice so I have asked Ofcom to address this question’’6 
In May 2011, Ofcom published a review of sections 17 and 18 of the DEA, which concluded 
that the site blocking provisions would be ineffective.7  
As will be seen, this paper’s major argument is that taking into account the findings of the 
CJEU in SABAM v Scarlet8 and SABAM v Netlog9, the UK government’s decision to drop 
site-blocking plans appears appropriate. The paper examines the findings of Fox v BT10. It 
contrasts such findings with the three-part cumulative test and considering the incompatibility of 
any site-blocking measure with the CJEU’s jurisprudence, concludes that the UK could 
possibly be in breach of European case-law.  
 
BLOCKING MEASURES UNDER THE FIRST-PART OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR’S 
CUMULATIVE TEST  
The first issue to be examined in this paper is to what extent, if any, the power to make 
provision about injunctions preventing access to internet locations may possibly be 
compatible with the first-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test. There is a legal 
rationale for permitting an interference with Article 10(2) of the ECHR that stems from the 
                                                 
4 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La 
Rue’ (16 May 2011) Session 7th UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 at page 8. 
5 Department for Culture, Media and Sports, ‘Ofcom to review aspects of Digital Economy Act’ News Release (1 February 2011) < 
http://www.culture.gov.uk/news/media_releases/7756.aspx > accessed 4 February, 2012. 
6 Ibid.  
7 ‘… we find that sections 17 and 18 are unlikely to be able to provide for a framework for site blocking which would be effective. We do 
not believe that it is possible to deliver a framework under the DEA which simultaneously meets the requirements of the copyright owners 
for a timely implementation of blocks and a flexible approach from service providers to tackling circumvention, with the need to respect the 
legitimate interests of site operators, service providers and end users’ see Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement 
– A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at 
page 50, accessed 4 February, 2012. 
8 Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) [2012] ECDR 4. 
9 Case 360-10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV [2012] ECR I-0000. 
10 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch). 
DEA site blocking provisions. This section will critically assess whether sections 17 and 18 
of the DEA respect the principles of predictability and transparency. According to the first-
part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test for any restriction upon the right to freedom 
of expression to be ‘‘prescribed by law’’ under Article 10(2) of the ECHR, the site blocking 
provisions should be drafted so that the provisions are clear and precise.11 Jeremy Hunt asked 
Ofcom to review the site blocking provisions. In particular, sections 17 and 18 of the DEA 
which give the Secretary of State the power to grant the courts the authority to compel service 
providers and other intermediaries, to block access to locations, which are suspected of being 
involved in copyright infringement.12 However, due to the lack of predictability, transparency 
and foreseeability inherent in the latter power, this section shows how, regardless of being 
‘‘prescribed by law’’ in view of the Opinion of the CJEU Advocate General Cruz Villalón in 
SABAM v Scarlet13 it is arguable that the UK government’s elimination of the site blocking 
provisions seems appropriate.  
The CJEU’s guidance in L’oreal v eBay 
To begin with, in line with the CJEU in L’oreal v eBay the third sentence of Article 11 of 
Directive 2004/48/EC read together with Article 18 of Directive 2000/31/EC permit domestic 
courts to require an online service provider to adopt measures that not only result in 
terminating contraventions, but also in precluding further violations.14  
 
Furthermore, the CJEU observes that it is also evident from recital 23 to Directive 
2004/48/EC that under the third sentence of Article 11 the conditions for the adoption of the 
injunctions for which the Member States need to implement are ‘‘a matter for national 
law’’.15 
 
Notwithstanding, as the Court elaborates, the above measures, which are ‘‘described (non-
exhaustively)’’ in addition to any other measure that could be ordered, need to strike a fair 
balance between the competing interests at stake.16  
  
                                                 
11 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La 
Rue’ (16 May 2011) Session 7th UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 at page 8. 
12 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 3, accessed 7 February, 2012. 
13 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2012] ECDR 4. 
14 Case 324/09 L'Oréal and Others [2011] ECR I-0000 [127], [132]. 
15 Ibid [135]. 
16 Ibid [143]. 
Blocking injunctions in the UK 
According to Ofcom’s review, content holders in the UK already have two methods of 
ensuring blocking injunctions. Firstly, a court could grant an injunction compelling the 
alleged contravening party to immediately stop the infringing act. Secondly, they also have 
section 97A of the CDPA.17  
However, since under the CDPA the injunction may only be granted when an infringement 
has already taken place Ofcom’s review notes that section 97A seems to be less suitable for 
ensuring injunctions than the DEA.18  
As stated in section 17 of the DEA:  
“(1) The Secretary of State may by regulations make provision about the granting by a court 
of a blocking injunction in respect of a location on the internet which the court is satisfied 
has been, is being or is likely to be used for or in connection with an activity that infringes 
copyright. 
 
(2) ‘Blocking injunction’ means an injunction that requires a service provider to prevent its 
service being used to gain access to the location.”19 
 
In Europe there has been a significant increase in the number of decisions where the 
problems associated with blocking injunctions have been addressed.20 Nevertheless, taking 
into account the findings of the CJEU in SABAM v Scarlet21 and SABAM v Netlog22 none of 
those cases appears to recognise the human rights issues raised by these orders to any greater 
extent than the British Fox v BT23.    
 
                                                 
17 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 46, accessed 7 February, 2012. 
18 Ibid.  
19 Digital Economy Act 2010 section 17.  
20 See for example IFPI Danmark v Tele 2 A/S (Copenhagen City Court,  25 October 2006); SABAM v Tiscali SA (Brussels Court of First 
Instance, 29 June 2007); IFPI Danmark v DMT2 A/S (Frederiskberg Court, 29 October 2008); Bergamo Public Prosecutor’s Officer v 
Kolmisappi (Italian Supreme Court of Cessation, 29 Sept 2009); Columbia Pictures Industries Inc v Portlane AB (Swedish Court of Appeal, 
4 May 2010); Nordic Records Norway AS v Telenor ASA (Borgarting Court of Appeal, 9 February 2010); Stichting Bescherming Rechten 
Entertainment Industrie Nederland (BREIN) v Ziggo BV (District Court of the Hague, 19 July 2010); EMI Records (Ireland) Ltd v UPC 
Communications Ireland Ltd [2010] IEHC 377; Constantin Film v UPC (Commercial Court of Austria, 13 May 2011); Twentieth Century 
Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWCH 608 (Ch); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] 
EWHC 1981 (Ch); Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 2714 (Ch); Dramatico 
Entertainment Limited and Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Limited and Ors [2012] EWHC 268 (Ch); Dramatico Entertainment Limited and 
Ors v British Sky Broadcasting Limited and Ors [2012] EWHC 1152 (Ch). 
21 Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) [2012] ECDR 4. 
22 Case 360-10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV [2012] ECR I-0000. 
23 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch). 
  
 
Definition of location, service provider and information society service 
Notably, in Fox v BT the claimants contend that section 17 of the DEA differentiates between 
the location that is employed to contravene copyright, and the service provider’s facility that 
is employed to access the location utilized to contravene copyright.24   
 
Although not mentioned in Fox v BT it is worth noting that Ofcom’s review understands 
location as being any host connected to the internet that can connect and transmit data to 
another web host.25  
However, in light of the analysis of whether consistent with the first-part of the Special 
Rapporteur’s cumulative test the site blocking provisions are ‘‘prescribed by law’’ under 
article 10(2) of the ECHR attention should be paid to the below definitions.  
 
The explanatory notes to the DEA assert that a service provider is one relating to provision of 
an information society service. Moreover, an information society service is ‘‘broadly 
defined’’ as any facility ‘‘normally’’ supplied for remuneration at a distance through 
electronic equipment. Interestingly, instances of these not only include ISPs but also site 
providers, such as, cyberlockers.26  
 
Sections 17 and 18 v section 97A 
On the other hand, of particular relevance is that pursuant to Ofcom’s review the site blocking 
provisions introduce a scheme for injunctions that is ‘‘much broader’’ than section 97A of the 
CDPA. For example, under the latter a service provider needs to have actual knowledge of 
information about an individual employing their facility to contravene copyright. However, 
Ofcom notes, the knowledge or lack thereof under section 17 of the DEA is irrelevant.27   
 
As Ofcom’s review explains, the important determinant is thus whether the site “has been, is 
being or is likely to be used for or in connection with” copyright infringement.28  
                                                 
24 Ibid [102]. 
25 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 9, accessed 20 February, 2012. 
26 Explanatory notes to the Digital Economy Act 2010 [80]. 
27 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 47, accessed 2 February, 2012. 
28 Ibid. 
 Problems 
First, if the injunction is formulated in very narrow terms, Ofcom’s review observes that 
blocking access to a particular IP address may be fairly easy to bypass. Notwithstanding, if 
the terms ‘‘are not sufficiently precise’’, service providers might find themselves in a difficult 
position.29  
Although neither addressed in SABAM v Scarlet30 nor in SABAM v Netlog31 an important note 
here is that Ofcom’s review is consistent with Villalón’s Opinion in the former decision. The 
Advocate General explains that the Charter rights can be limited where permitted under 
domestic laws which are “accessible, clear and predictable”.32 
 
It is interesting to note, however, that according to Ofcom under both the site blocking 
provisions and section 97A, content holders or their agents would still have to prove that the 
alleged contravention concerned copyright in compositions held by them. Yet, as Fox v 
Newzbin33 evidences, this could sometimes pose a challenge.34  
 
All things considered, to be aligned with the first-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative 
test for article 10(2) of the ECHR to be ‘prescribed by law’’ sections 17 and 18 of the DEA 
need to be compatible with the principles of predictability and transparency.35 As discussed 
below, it is disputable that in view of Villalón’s Opinion in SABAM v Scarlet36 their 
elimination by the UK government seems appropriate. 
Site blocking provisions inconsistency with the principle of predictability 
Firstly, one might debate that in rejecting the site blocking provisions the UK government 
can be regarded as having made an informed decision.  
                                                 
29 Ibid at page 48. 
30 Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) [2012] ECDR 4. 
31 Case 360-10 Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV [2012] ECR I-0000. 
32 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2012] ECDR 4 [96]. 
33 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWCH 608 (Ch). 
34 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 47, accessed 1 March, 2012. 
35 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La 
Rue’ (16 May 2011) Session 7th UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 at page 8. 
36 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2012] ECDR 4.  
As outlined above, in line with the first-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test, 
under article 10(2) of the ECHR to be ‘‘prescribed by law’’ any interference with the right to 
freedom of speech needs to respect the principle of predictability.37  
 
Or put differently, as the CJEU’s Advocate General recommends in SABAM v Scarlet, to 
conform to the ECtHR’s case-law the legislation must clearly establish the circumstances 
under which it is applicable.38  
 
According to Ofcom’s review, section 17 of the DEA introduces a scheme for injunctions 
that is ‘‘much broader’’ than section 97A of the CDPA.39 Specifically, following section 
17(2):  
‘‘‘blocking injunction’ means an injunction that requires a service provider to prevent its 
service being used to gain access to the location.’’40 
Moreover, a service provider is one relating to provision of an information society service 
and the latter is ‘‘broadly defined’’ as any service ‘‘normally’’ supplied for remuneration at a 
distance via electronic equipment.41  
In other words, this definition seems broad enough to include any service, including email, 
application providers like Twitter, video-sharing sites such as Vimeo as well as search 
engines like Google.   
 
Thus, considering Villalón’s Opinion above the UK government’s decision to reject website 
blocking plans appears fair. Indeed, all the more so given that in BT v State Parker J expressly 
recognises that ‘‘section 17 does not prescribe the circumstances in which the regulations 
would allow an injunction to be applied for or granted by the court’’.42 Not to mention the 
impact of such measures on the free speech rights of ISPs, site operators and users.  
 
                                                 
37 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La 
Rue’ (16 May 2011) Session 7th UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 at page 8. 
38 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2012] ECDR 4 [94]. 
39 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 47, accessed 1 March, 2012. 
40 Digital Economy Act 2010 section 17(2). 
41 Explanatory notes to the Digital Economy Act 2010 [80]. 
42 BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and others [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin) [51]. 
Site blocking provisions inconsistency with the principle of transparency 
Secondly, another point at which the UK government excels is the acknowledgement of the 
fact that significant problems arise when assessing the terms of any injunction. Indeed, as the 
Advocate General in SABAM v Scarlet explains, if those terms are not sufficiently clear any 
blocking measure could possibly be challenged as illegal.43  
It has been seen earlier that consistent with the first-part of the Special Rapporteur’s 
cumulative test for any limitation to the right to freedom of expression to be ‘‘prescribed by 
law’’ such law should comply with the principle of transparency.44  
 
Or put differently, pursuant to Villalón’s Opinion in SABAM v Scarlet45 it is well established 
in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence that:  
 
‘‘the law must indicate… the manner of its exercise with sufficient clarity… to give the 
individual adequate protection against arbitrary interference.’’46 
 
It is true that peer-to-peer file-sharing seems to account for the best part of online copyright 
infringement.47 However, as Ofcom’s review notes: 
 
Streaming: is also a technology employed by many legal sites (e.g., BBC iPlayer and 
YouTube).  
 
Cyberlockers/Cloud storage: is likewise a widely used technology that can search for and 
locate lawful and unlawful content such as pictures and documents.  
 
USENET: is similar to a virtual bulletin board where again users can legally post comments 
and files.48  
                                                 
43 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2012] ECDR 4 [67], [94], [95]. 
44 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La 
Rue’ (16 May 2011) Session 7th UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 at page 8. 
45 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2012] ECDR 4 [94]. 
46 Kruslin v France (App no 11801/85) (1990) 12 EHRR 547 [30]; see also the Sunday Times v the United Kingdom (Series A no 30) (1979) 
2 EHHR 245 [49]; Tolstoy Miloslavsky v the United Kingdom (App no 18139/91) (1995) 20 EHRR 442 [37]; Rotaru v Romania (App no 
28341/95) (2000) ECHR 2000-V [52]; Hasan and Chaush v Bulgaria (App no 30985/96) (2000) ECHR 2000-XI [84]; Maestri v Italy (App 
no 39748/98) (2004) ECHR 2004-I [30]; Sanoma Uitgevers BV v The Netherlands (App no 38224/03) (2010) ECHR 1284 [82]. 
47 BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and others [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin) [230]. 
48 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 13, accessed 5 March, 2012. 
 In other words, those of Parker J in BT v State ‘‘it must be remembered that P2P is not the 
only means of gaining access to copyright... material.’’49 
Therefore, the impact of the site blocking provisions on perfectly legitimate technologies is 
yet another example of why the UK’s government abandonment of section 17 of the DEA 
seems appropriate. Let alone the negative effect that these measures could also have on 
innovation. 
Site blocking provisions inconsistency with the requirement of foreseeability 
Thirdly, as Fox v Newzbin50 illustrates, a final strong point of Ofcom’s review is the UK 
government’s acceptance that considering both section 97A and the site blocking provisions 
the complexity involved in detecting infringing content could sometimes pose a challenge.51 
According to the ECtHR’s well-established case-law, in order for a restriction on the right to 
freedom of expression to be ‘‘prescribed by law’’ the requirement of foreseeability should 
also be satisfied.52  
Put another way, as the CJEU’s Advocate General observers in SABAM v Scarlet53 in light of 
the Strasbourg organs Leander v Sweden under Article 10(2) of the ECHR: 
 ‘‘the law in question must be accessible to the individual concerned and its consequences for 
him must also be foreseeable.’’54  
In Fox v Newzbin55 36 TV shows are reported to be likely to be copyright-protected. 
Moreover, in the case of ‘Music’, 112 tracks are suspected to be associated with material 
otherwise likely to be copyright-protected. And in the case of ‘Books’, 48 records are 
considered to be likely to be copyright-protected.56 
Nevertheless, the question remains as to when the term ‘‘likely’’ crosses the boundary of 
infringement. The CJEU in SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog found that blocking 
                                                 
49 BT PLC and Talk Talk PLC v Secretary of State for Business Innovation and Skills and others [2011] EWHC 1021 (Admin) [251]. 
50 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWCH 608 (Ch). 
51 Ofcom, ‘‘Site Blocking’’ to reduce online copyright infringement – A review of sections 17 and18 of the Digital Economy Act’ < 
http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/internet/site-blocking.pdf > at page 47, accessed 5 March, 2012. 
52 See for example Kopp v Switzerland (app no 23224/94) (1999) 27 EHRR 91 [64], [72]. 
53 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2012] ECDR 4 [94]. 
54 Leander v Sweden (App no 9248/81) (1987) 9 EHRR 433 [50]; see also Malone v United Kingdom (App no 8691/79) (1984) 7 EHRR 14 
[66]. 
55 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp v Newzbin Ltd [2010] EWCH 608 (Ch). 
56 Twentieth Century Fox Film Corp & Ors v British Telecommunications Plc [2011] EWHC 1981 (Ch) [51]. 
measures ‘‘might not distinguish adequately between unlawful…and lawful content’’.57 Thus, 
one could debate that the ‘‘likely to be used for or in connection with’’58 infringement test 
may not necessarily recognise whether for instance mashups, bootlegs and remixes are 
legitimate.  
Consequently, given that users would almost certainly fail to foresee what transforming 
copyrighted content may entail, again the UK’s government removal of section 17 of the 
DEA appears fair. Not to mention the profoundly detrimental effects that those provisions 
would also have upon collaborative creativity. 
Incompatibility with the first-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test 
This section has examined whether the power to make provision about injunctions preventing 
access to internet locations could possibly be consistent with the first-part of the Special 
Rapporteur’s cumulative test. There is a legal rationale for permitting interference that stems 
from sections 17 and 18 of the DEA. However, the first major finding of this paper is that 
despite being ‘‘prescribed by law’’ under article 10(2) of the ECHR from the ECtHR and the 
CJEU’s Advocate General perspective the site blocking provisions appear to be at odds with 
the principles of predictability, transparency and foreseeability. Thus, instead of censoring 
perfectly legitimate sites, neutral technologies and transformative uses of copyrighted works, 
an important practical implication of this section is that in the light of Villalón’s Opinion in 
SABAM v Scarlet59 it is submitted that the UK government’s show of support for freedom of 
speech online appears fair. It is therefore understandable why in rejecting sections 17 and 18 
of the DEA Ofcom’s review seems to suggest that the right to freedom of expression, 
innovation and creativity must be respected. Nevertheless, as discussed next, assuming that 
the site blocking provisions had not been rejected they would in any case have to conform to 
the second-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test. As a result, under article 10(2) of 
the ECHR so as ‘‘to protect the rights of others’’ the site blocking provisions should also 




                                                 
57 Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) [2012] ECDR 4 [52]; Case 360-10 
Belgische Vereniging van Auteurs, Componisten en Uitgevers CVBA (SABAM) v Netlog NV [2012] ECR I-0000 [50]. 
58 Digital Economy Act 2010 section 17(1).  
59 Advocate General’s Opinion in Case 70-10 Scarlet Extended SA v Société belge des auteurs, compositeurs et éditeurs SCRL (SABAM) 
[2012] ECDR 4. 
60 UNHRC, ‘Report of the Special Rapporteur on the promotion and protection of the right to freedom of opinion and expression, Frank La 
Rue’ (16 May 2011) Session 7th UN Doc A/HRC/17/27 at page 8. 
  
 
BLOCKING MEASURES UNDER THE SECOND-PART OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR’S 
CUMULATIVE TEST 
 
The second matter to be examined in this paper is whether conforming to the second-part of 
the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test the DEA site blocking provisions comply with the 
principle of legitimacy.61 In Fox v BT Arnold J finds that the studios copyrights are “rights of 
others” within the meaning of article 10(2) of the ECHR.62 However, as he notes, in Fox v 
Newzbin63 Kitchin J is not referred to any relevant laws and jurisprudence, which directly 
affect human rights. Thus, where the court becomes aware of evidence that the Convention 
rights of content holders other than the participants to a copyright dispute are compromised, 
according to Arnold J it is not simply empowered, but ‘‘obliged’’, to respect them.64 As will 
be discussed, in light of the CJEU SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog for any limitation 
to freedom of expression to ‘‘protect the rights of others’’ content holders’ rights need to be 
fairly balanced against those of ISPs, site operators and users.65 Therefore, in contrast with 
Arnold J’s finding this section will show why the UK government’s rejection of sections 17 
and 18 of the DEA seems appropriate. Indeed, this is particularly true when perfectly 
legitimate online speech, like employing a site with no intention of infringing upon copyright 
needs to be censored by the High Court but could possibly be found illegitimate by both the 
second-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test and the CJEU’s case-law.  
 
The studios’ interest in Newzbin2  
To begin with, in Fox v BT pursuant to Arnold J movies and TV shows make up about 70% 
of the available content through Newzbin2 whilst approximately 30% of that content 
comprises different types of material.66 
 
Yet though the studios control the copyrights to many movies and TV shows distributed by 
Newzbin2, he notes that it is evident that other content owners are likewise ‘‘substantially 
affected’’ by it.67 
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 Of particular relevance here, however, is that the respondent claims that it would be 
inappropriate to grant an injunction that goes beyond the repertoire where the studios hold 
rights, and to compel BT to block its users from accessing any element of Newzbin2 for any 
purpose.68  
 
In particular, in support of the above BT gathers evidence from two decisions - CPI v 
Robinson69 and Fox v Newzbin70.  
 
 
CPI v Robinson  
 
First, consistent with Arnold J in Fox v BT71, in CPI v Robinson Scott J held: 
 
‘‘... Counsel... has sought an injunction restraining the defendants from knowingly infringing 
copyright in any film for the time belonging to any of the plaintiffs (meaning any member of 
the MPAA besides the named plaintiffs) or in respect of which any of them is for the time 
being the exclusive licensee... it would be wrong in principle to grant an injunction the scope 
of which the defendants subject to it could not know and could not discover... Experience... 
has underlined the very great difficulty... in ascertaining in whom copyright or exclusive 
rights... are... being vested... I am not prepared to extend this protection to companies who 
are not plaintiffs, that is... to future MPAA members. Nor am I prepared to extend this 
protection to cover other films’’.72  
 
Although not mentioned in Fox v BT in deciding whether to grant an injunction section 17 of 
the DEA states that the court needs to take account of any proof of steps taken by the content 
holder, or by a licensee73 and “copyright owner” has to be understood as in the CDPA.74 
 
Yet in Fox v BT the High Court is convinced that the above decision does not answer whether 
an injunction should be granted, but instead the scope of the injunction.75 Accordingly, 
Arnold J finds no support in CPI v Robinson76 for the contention that an applicant cannot 
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secure an injunction that goes beyond the particular copyrights found to have been 
contravened.77  
 
It is interesting to note, however, that pursuant to the Court ‘‘it is commonplace for 
rightholders... to be granted injunctions covering the entire repertoire... even though 
infringements of only a small number of copyrights have been proved.’’78 
 
Furthermore, of particular importance is that Arnold J selects Fox v Newzbin79 to endorse the 
claim that Kitchin J granted injunctive relief that not only included the studios present 
repertoire, but ‘‘also future additions’’.80 
 
 
Fox v Newzbin  
 
Secondly, in Fox v BT the respondent relies on Fox v Newzbin81 where Kitchin J declines to 
grant an injunction extending beyond the studios’ copyrights repertoire on the grounds he 
gives at [135].82   
 
Notwithstanding, as Arnold J observes, in Fox v Newzbin this issue is not disputed before 
Kitchin J in any depth.83 However, in view of the analysis of whether under Article 10(2) of 
the ECHR the site blocking provisions comply with the second-part of the Special 
Rapporteur’s cumulative test, the Court’s next finding becomes crucial.  
 
According to Arnold J, it appears evident from Fox v Newzbin84 that Kitchin J is not referred 
to any of the case-law relevant to the Human Rights Act 1998. Thus, where the court 
appreciates from such evidence that the Convention rights of individuals other than the 
participants are involved, Arnold J finds that it is not simply authorized, but ‘‘obliged’’, to 
respect them.85 
 
Notably, this seems to contradict SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog where the CJEU 
notes that there is nothing under Article 17(2) of the Charter or the Court’s jurisprudence to 
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indicate that intellectual property rights are absolute and consequently must always be 
protected.86  
 
As Arnold J elaborates, the studios’ rights are being violated on an enormous scale. Thus he 
is satisfied that they have a ‘‘sufficient interest’’ to justify the power to grant the order 
sought.87  
 
Nevertheless, while the injunction will likewise benefit other content owners, consistent with 
Arnold J this is not a strong enough reason for declining injunctive relief. As the Court 
curiously put it, ‘‘it is immaterial that they have not formally joined in the application’’.88  
 
 
Against this background, although Arnold J finds that ‘‘the order would potentially prevent 
BT subscribers from making use of Newzbin2 for non-infringing uses’’ he nevertheless 
concludes that these non-infringing purposes are de minimis.89 
 
Again this is also inconsistent with SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog where the CJEU 
held that the legality of blocking measures also depends on their impact upon three key 
elements: exceptions to copyright, public domain material, and free content.90   
Overall, according to the second-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test, sections 17 
and 18 of the DEA should be enforced with the principle of legitimacy respect.91 Thus, 
despite protecting the ‘‘rights of others’’ the below discussion demonstrates why following 
SABAM v Scarlet92 and SABAM v Netlog93  the UK government’s refusal to implement the 
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Covering the entire repertoire? 
 
Firstly, how persuasive is Arnold J’s finding that ‘‘it is commonplace for rightholders… to be 
granted injunctions covering the entire repertoire... even though infringements of only a 
small number of copyrights have been proved.’’94 
 
In Mustafa v Sweden the ECtHR held that under Article 10 of the ECHR the freedom to 
receive information is not only applicable to speech on matters of public concern, but 
involves cultural expressions in addition to ‘‘pure entertainment’’.95  
 
As outlined above, in Fox v BT the respondent relies upon Fox v Newzbin96 in which Kitchin 
J opposes granting an injunction going beyond the studios’ copyrights repertoire on the 
grounds he provides at [135].97 Nevertheless, the High Court finds that in Fox v Newzbin this 
issue is not disputed by Kitchin J in any depth.98  
 
Yet in Fox v BT99 what Arnold J regrettably appears to disregard is the fact that the studios 
request an injunction broader in scope where injunctive relief is more troublesome.  
Or put differently, consistent with Kitchin J: 
‘‘… the claimants are seeking an injunction to restrain activities in relation to all binary and 
all text materials in respect of which they own no rights.’’100 
Indeed, this is interesting because Arnold J’s finding is at odds with SABAM v Scarlet and 
SABAM v Netlog where the CJEU found that since such an injunction ‘‘is intended to protect 
not only existing works’’ it can no longer be deemed to respect the fair balance between 
copyright protection, and the freedom for ISP’s to conduct their business.101  
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Thus, it is understandable why, following Ofcom’s review the UK government suggests that 
as ownership of copyright would still need to be proven the DEA site blocking provisions can 
make this all the more difficult.102 
 
Future additions to the repertoire 
Secondly, in Fox v BT the High Court regards Fox v Newzbin103 as authority for the 
contention that Kitchin J granted an injunction that not only included the studios’ present 
repertoire, but ‘‘also future additions’’.104  
 
It is true that according to well-established ECtHR case-law - KU v Finland: 
 
‘‘although… users of telecommunications and internet services must have a guarantee that 
their own privacy and freedom of expression will be respected, such guarantee cannot be 
absolute and must yield on occasion to other legitimate imperatives such as the prevention 
and disorder of crime or the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.’’105 
  
However, again it is worth emphasizing that despite the fact that Fox v BT remains very 
relevant, Arnold J’s finding in the above passage regarding the injunctive relief process is at 
best objectionable and at worst entirely inconsistent with the CJEU’s case-law.  
 
Indeed, all the more so given that in SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog the CJEU 
explicitly recognizes that such an injunction ‘‘…has no limitation in time, is directed at all 
future infringements and is intended to protect not only existing, but also future works that 
have not yet been created’’.106  
 
Accordingly, as the CJEU elaborates, in the present case, once more it must be concluded that 
the injunction can no longer be deemed to respect the fair balance between copyright 
protection, and the freedom for ISP’s to conduct their business.107 
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Taken together, in light of the second-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test, as 
Ofcom’s review stresses, one could therefore argue that keeping in mind sections 17 and 18 
of the DEA this balance seems to be extremely difficult to strike for many courts in the vast 
majority of cases.108 
 
How to avoid being vexed twice  
Thirdly, in Fox v BT Arnold J finds in paragraph 185 that ‘‘it is immaterial’’ that other 
content owners who could also benefit from the order ‘‘have not formally joined in the 
application’’109 regrettably however without any solid evidence to support his claim.  
 
There is little doubt that intellectual property protection is certainly enshrined within 
Article 17(2) of the Charter.110 As SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog explain: 
 
‘‘there is, however, nothing whatsoever in the wording of that provision or in the Court’s 
case-law to suggest that that right is inviolable and must for that reason be absolutely 
protected.’’111 
 
As discussed above, according to the Court in Fox v BT it is evident that the studios’ rights 
are being contravened on an enormous scale. Thus Arnold J is satisfied that they have a 
‘‘sufficient interest’’ to justify the power to grant injunctive relief.112  
 
Yet, as the ECtHR acknowledged in Lindon v France:  
 
‘‘... even where a statement amounts to a value judgment, there must exist a sufficient factual 
basis to support it, failing which it will be excessive.’’113 
 
 
In Media v Adams, the Patents County Court crucially observes that the purpose of subsection 
102(1) of the CDPA is to protect respondents from being sued twice over the same issue.114 
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Or put differently, in Birss J words, ‘‘it seems likely, therefore, that a court will expect 
claimants to take considerable steps to identify other persons with rights before it will grant 
permission to proceed without their being joined’’.115 
 
Indeed, despite Arnold J’s finding the non-derogable right not be tried or punished twice is a 
minimum guarantee of the accussed’s right to a fair trial under Article 4 of Protocol No 7 to 
the ECHR.116  
 
Incompatibility with the second-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test 
This section has examined whether the DEA site blocking provisions could respect the 
second-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test. Although according to Fox v BT, the 
studios copyrights are “rights of others” under article 10(2) of the ECHR117 the second major 
finding of this paper is that from both the ECtHR and the CJEU perspective sections 17 and 
18 of the DEA might possibly be inconsistent with the principle of legitimacy. Yet instead of 
extending injunctive relief to entire repertoires, future additions and non-claimants another 
significant practical implication of this section is that in light of SABAM v Scarlet and 
SABAM v Netlog the UK could be in breach of European case-law. Indeed, as the CJEU 
suggests, because the use of exempted, public domain or creative commons licensed material 
is non-infringing118, no court should ever be allowed to restrict upon the notion of striking a 
fair balance between copyright holders’ interests and those of ISPs, site operators and users. 
Thus it is easy to justify why in conforming to Ofcom’s review the removal by the UK 
government of the DEA’s ability to block artistic content on the web seems appropriate. 
However, as will be discussed next, in order to solve the above unresolved problem 
consistent with the third-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test, the real question is 
whether the power to make provision about injunctions preventing access to internet locations 
complies with the principles of necessity and proportionality.119  
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BLOCKING MEASURES UNDER THE THIRD-PART OF THE SPECIAL RAPPORTEUR’S 
CUMULATIVE TEST 
 
In line with the third-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test the next issue to be 
considered is whether the site blocking provisions conform to the principles of necessity and 
proportionality.120 Ofcom’s review notes that under the DEA, content holders expect the legal 
system to result in injunctions coming into operation within hours after an application being 
made. This demonstrates the concern that they have over the sudden loss of value from 
unlawfully streaming live content and from the urgent need to restrict access to pre-release 
material.121 However, as Ofcom elaborates, due to the speed at which site operators adopt 
bypass mechanisms a long period between an application being approved and a block being 
performed decreases the effectiveness of the site blocking provisions. Thus, as Ofcom adds, it 
is unclear whether injunctive relief offers the remedy sought by content holders in terms of 
both its speed and flexibility.122 In Fox v BT Arnold J finds that it is ‘‘necessary’’ and 
‘‘proportionate’’ to block Newzbin2 as the Article 1 First Protocol rights of the studios not 
only override the Article 10 rights of BT but also those of users and operators of 
Newzbin2.123 Notwithstanding, due to the ineffectiveness, severity and lack of procedural 
fairness of any blocking measure, this section argues, how considering the third-part of 
Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test as well as SABAM v Scarlet124 and SABAM v Netlog125 
the UK government’s elimination of the site blocking provisions appears fair.   
 
The conflict from Fox v BT perspective 
To begin with, in Fox v BT pursuant to the High Court, it is preferable to adopt the view 
taken by the studios, inter alia, for the following reasons:  
 
First, under Article 1 of the First Protocol the studios’ copyrights are protected property 
rights.126   
 
Secondly, the right to freedom of expression is also engaged under Article 10(1). It applies 
regarding BT’s clients’ right to receive information.127 Notably, this is consistent with 
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SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog although in contrast to Arnold J the CJEU finds that 
blocking measures could not only contravene users’ right to receive information but also their 
right to personal data protection.128 
 
Thirdly, the studios’ copyrights are ‘‘rights of others’’ as contained in Article 10(2).129  
 
Fourthly, when Article 10 and Article 8 ECHR rights are engaged the High Court finds In re 
S130 to be applicable where a balance needs to be struck between Article 10 and Article 1 of 
the First Protocol.131 
 
Or put differently:  
 
‘‘(i) neither Article as such has precedence over the other; (ii) where the values under the 
two Articles are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative importance of the specific 
rights being claimed in the individual case is necessary; (iii) the justifications for interfering 
with or restricting each right must be taken into account; (iv) finally, the proportionality test 
– or "ultimate balancing test" - must be applied to each.’’132  
 
Fifthly, in the copyright context, the above balance is mainly struck by the CDPA although 
the court needs to take account of freedom of expression considering both Ashdown v 
Telegraph133 and Promusicae v Telefonica134.135  
  
Accordingly, Arnold J turns to the evaluation of the effectiveness and proportionality of the 
order.  
 
Effectiveness of the order sought 
On one hand, in Fox v BT the evidence demonstrates that the operators of Newzbin2 have ‘‘at 
least two’’ circumvention tools to allow users to bypass BT’s block.136 However, in view of 
the analysis of whether the site blocking provisions comply with the Special Rapporteur’s 
principles of necessity and proportionality it is important to note Arnold J’s next finding. 
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According to the High Court, it is neither necessary nor adequate to describe these bypass 
mechanisms in any detail.137 As Arnold J observes, injunctive relief may be effectively 
granted for, inter alia, the following reasons.  
 
First, it appears probable that circumvention will compel most users to gain additional 
expertise. Nevertheless, of particular relevance is that ‘‘even assuming that they all have the 
ability to acquire such expertise’’ Arnold J is satisfied that ‘‘it does not follow that they will 
all wish to expend the time and effort required.’’138 
 
Secondly, consistent with the Court circumvention is likely to result in lower quality 
downloads and slower operation.139  
 
 
Thirdly, Arnold J finds support in BT and TalkTalk v State140 for the proposition that although 
‘‘... technical means of avoiding detection are available... the central difficulty of this 
argument is that it rests upon assumptions about human behaviour.’’141 
 
Finally, the Court elaborates ‘‘the order would be justified even if it only prevented access to 
Newzbin2 by a minority of users.’’142 
 
Although not touched upon in Fox v BT it is however worth remembering that in L’oreal v 
eBay the CJEU found that the domestic rules for the enforcement of injunctions must be 
devised so that the aim pursued by Directive 2004/48 may be attained.143 Or put differently, 
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Proportionality of the order sought 
On the other hand, in Fox v BT Arnold J finds that injunctive relief is ‘‘proportionate’’.145  
 
According to Arnold J:  
‘‘It is necessary... to protect the Article 1 First Protocol rights of the Studios and other 
copyright owners. Those interests clearly outweigh the Article 10 rights of the users of 
Newzbin2, and... the Article 10 rights of the operators of Newzbin2. They also outweigh BT’s 
own Article 10 rights.’’146 
 
Yet this is inconsistent with Ofcom’s review. Indeed, where there is a threat to the legitimate 
interests of other operators, say, those sharing the same IP address at the affected location, 
Ofcom suggests that the Court needs to determine what effect a block could have not only 
upon these individuals but also other users.147  
 
Interestingly, Ofcom’s view is reinforced by SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog where 
the CJEU held that domestic measures taken to protect content owners, must strike the right 
balance between copyright protection and the protection of fundamental rights of people 
affected by them (Promusicae v Telefonica148).149   
 
That said in Fox v BT the ISP claims that the injunction should require the studios to notify 
specific URLs regarding the specific NZBs files catalogued by Newzbin2 that correspond to 
unauthorized copies of specific copyright compositions.150 However, as this order requires 
the studios to spend a great deal of time, effort, and money in passing large URL records to 
BT daily, Arnold J finds that it ‘‘would not be proportionate’’.151  
 
Overall, consistent with the third-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test, the factors 
to be considered when assessing the necessity and proportionality of blocking provisions 
include their effectiveness, severity and procedural fairness.152 As shown below, in light of 
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well-established CJEU case-law it is submitted that their rejection by the UK government 
seems fair.  
Effectiveness of the site blocking provisions 
Firstly, the main problem of Fox v BT is that rather than following the expert evidence 
according to Arnold J the order sought is considered to be an effective relief. For example, in 
paragraph 192 the evidence demonstrates that the operators of Newzbin2 have ‘‘at least two’’ 
ways of enabling users to circumvent BT’s block.153 However, the High Court held that it is 
not necessary or adequate grounds to examine the likely effectiveness of these bypass 
mechanisms.154   
It is firmly rooted in the ECtHR’s jurisprudence that “the Convention is intended to 
guarantee not rights that are theoretical or illusory but rights that are practical and 
effective.’’155 
As discussed above, although circumvention will require most users to gain additional 
expertise the Court finds that ‘‘it does not follow that they will all wish to expend the time 
and effort required.’’156 Regrettably, however, Arnold J makes such a claim without the need 
for evidence. Yet this is certainly surprising since Fox v BT was delivered in July 2011 that is 
after the publication of Ofcom’s review of sections 17 and 18 of the DEA in May 2011.  
 
Or put differently, as the latter document found: 
 “Circumvention of a block is technically a relatively trivial matter irrespective of which of 
the techniques used… It…does not require a particularly high level of skill or expertise.”157  
Therefore, despite Arnold J’s finding an impartial court could have concluded that the 
ineffectiveness of blocking measures is yet another piece for regarding the UK government’s 
destruction of the blocking provisions puzzle as remarkable. Indeed, this is particularly true 
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when in L’oreal v eBay the CJEU held that in view of Article 3(2) of Directive 2004/48 such 
measures have to be ‘‘effective’’ and ‘‘dissuasive’’.158 
Severity of the site blocking provisions 
Secondly, in Fox v BT the High Court also finds that it is ‘‘necessary’’ and ‘‘proportionate’’ 
to grant injunctive relief as the Article 1 First Protocol rights of the studios clearly override 
the Article 10 rights of BT and those of users and operators of Newzbin2.159 However, the 
regrettable fact remains that again Arnold J provides no evidence which can be relied upon to 
support his claim. 
As the Strasbourg organs held in Guerra v Italy, under article 10(2) of the ECHR 
guaranteeing freedom of expression “basically prohibits a government from restricting a 
person from receiving information that others wish or may be willing to impart to him.’’160 
It is true that consistent with Arnold J in Fox v BT the problem of online copyright 
infringement is ‘‘eloquently described by Charleton J’’ in EMI v UPC161.162 It is worth noting 
nevertheless that upon the question of proportionality of blocking measures Charleton J of the 
Irish High Court wrote: 
 
‘‘I am not convinced… that any solution based on blocking... is reasonable…it would not be 
in accordance with the principle of proportionality to use a blunt instrument for the 
deterrence, or rendering impossible, of illegal activity, when the effect of that would 
inevitably lead to the infringement on the right of communication through the internet.’’163 
 
Thus considering the third-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test one might debate 
that in rejecting the site blocking provisions the UK government arrives at a judicious 
decision. Indeed, this is particularly the case when in SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog 
the CJEU found that as an injunction order may not differentiate properly between unlicensed 
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and licensed copyrighted material, ‘‘its introduction could lead to the blocking of lawful 
communications’’.164 
 
A less invasive alternative than the site blocking provisions  
Thirdly, another problem that arises in Fox v BT is that BT disputes that the injunction should 
compel the studios to notify them of all URLs that relate to the specific NZB files listed by 
Newzbin2 that correspond to unauthorized copies of specific copyright compositions.165 
However, Arnold J finds such an order to be disproportionate or impracticable since it would 
oblige the Studios to devote considerable effort and resources in notifying extensive 
catalogues of URLs to BT daily.166   
 
Yet, limitations to a defendant’s rights are always required to respect and adhere to the 
‘‘strict necessity’’ test or the least invasive means condition. A well established part of 
Strasbourg organs’ case-law.167 
It is worth stressing that if the UK government wants to implement a site blocking scheme, 
Ofcom’s review recommends that further research be conducted to detect and assess 
‘‘alternative legal frameworks’’ which could be more suitable. Specifically, Ofcom’s review 
suggests complementary measures, such as, search engine de-listing, squeezing advertising 
revenues, but perhaps most relevantly notice/take-down systems.168   
Crucially, in L’oreal v eBay the Advocate General observes that in Finland, for instance, in 
light of Directive 2000/31/EC, a hosting service provider is compelled to eliminate 
information stored on the system only after receipt of a valid notification of copyright 
infringement and the user has the ability to challenge the removal within two weeks.169  
In other words, as expressly acknowledged by the ECtHR in Lentia v Austria: 
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“… above all, it cannot be argued that there are no equivalent less restrictive solutions.’’170 
Taken together both, the less restrictive alternative sought by BT and Ofcom’s 
complementary measures, once more the UK government’s elimination of sections 17 and 18 
of the DEA seems fair.  
Incompatibility with the third-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test 
This section has analysed whether the DEA site blocking provisions could conform to the 
third-part of the Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test. Since the Article 1 First Protocol rights 
of the studios not only clearly offset the Article 10 rights of BT but also those of the operators 
and the users of Newzbin2 in Fox v BT Arnold J finds that it is ‘‘necessary’’ and 
‘‘proportionate’’ to block it.171 However, given the ineffectiveness of blocking measures, 
their impact on Article 10 Convention rights and the studios’ ability to minimally intrude on 
free speech, the third major finding of this paper is that sections 17 and 18 of the DEA might 
possibly be incompatible with the principles of necessity and proportionality. Indeed, all the 
more so since according to the CJEU L’oreal v eBay injunctions must be ‘‘effective’’, 
‘‘dissuasive’’ and ‘‘proportionate’’, and cannot lead to barriers to lawful trade. 172 Thus, 
another significant practical implication that arises from this section is that again the UK 
could be at odds with European case-law. It is therefore understandable why, in assessing the 
necessity and proportionality of the site blocking provisions Ofcom’s review recommends 
that they are removed.173 However, as discussed in the following section, under Article 10(2) 
of the ECHR taking into account the findings of Section I, Section II and Section III, the last 
important area of consideration will be to assess whether the implementation of content 
blocking systems like Cleanfeed is compliant with the CJEU case-law. 
 
THE LEGALITY OF CONTENT BLOCKING SYSTEMS FROM THE CJEU PERSPECTIVE  
Having exhausted the three-part Special Rapporteur’s cumulative test that is whether under 
article 10(2) of the ECHR sections 17 and 18 of the DEA are ‘‘prescribed by law’’, in order 
to ‘‘protect the rights of others’’ ISPs, site operators and users’ right to freedom of 
expression could be subject to blocking injunctions, and whether these restraining orders may 
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go further than what is reasonably ‘‘necessary’’ and ‘‘proportionate’’; for practical purposes, 
the last important consideration covered in this paper is to evaluate whether the 
implementation of content blocking systems respects the CJEU’s case-law. As will be 
discussed, in Fox v BT Arnold J regards the CJEU L’Oréal v eBay174 as authority for the 
proposition that under Article 15(1) of the E-Commerce Directive, the Cleanfeed filter does 
not require BT to perform active monitoring but merely to block Newzbin2.175 However, 
taking into account the main conclusions presented in Section I, Section II and Section III, 
regardless of Arnold J’s finding this section will suggest how Fox v BT could possibly be 
inconsistent with the CJEU’s jurisprudence, once more with SABAM v Scarlet176 and SABAM 
v Netlog177. Indeed this is particularly true when following Ofcom’s review the UK 
government understands that the power to make provision about injunctions preventing 
access to internet locations appears to be an ineffective solution that fails to strike the right 
balance between the interests of content holders and those of ISPs, site operators and users.178  
 
A specific monitoring obligation  
To begin with, in Fox v BT the High Court finds that the order sought by the studios does not 
constitute a general monitoring obligation but instead a limited and specific one.179 As Arnold 
J notes: 
 
First, recital (47) of the E-Commerce Directive states that Article 15(1) does not “concern 
monitoring obligations in a specific case and, in particular, does not affect orders by 
national authorities in accordance with national legislation”.180 
 
Although not explicitly referred to in Fox v BT it should be noted that following the CJEU in 
L’oreal v eBay the third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 2004/48/EC read together with 
Article 18 of Directive 2000/31/EC permit domestic courts to require an online service 
provider to adopt measures that not only result in terminating contraventions, but also in 
precluding further violations.181  
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Secondly, in L’Oréal v eBay182 at [139] the CJEU regards “a general obligation to monitor” 
as “an active monitoring of all the data of each of [a website’s] customers in order to 
prevent any future infringement”.183 However, for practical purposes, the High Court’s next 
finding becomes of paramount importance.  
 
According to Arnold J, in this case the injunction ‘‘does not require BT to engage in active 
monitoring of the kind described by the Court of Justice… but simply to block... the Newzbin2 
website by automated means that do not involve detailed inspection of the data of any of BT’s 
subscribers.’’184 
 
Most interestingly, with regards to the level of monitoring, consistent with the Court the 
monitoring obligation ‘‘is specific rather than general.’’185  
 
Cleanfeed 
On the other hand, in Fox v BT pursuant to Arnold J the order sought by the studios, also 
known as Cleanfeed is a hybrid filter of IP address blocking and Deep Packet Inspection 
(DPI)-based URL blocking which functions as a two-stage device.186  
 
However, of particular relevance here is that the High Court observes that DPI can occur at 
three inspection levels; first, minimal analysis; second, summary analysis; or third, 
systematic, intrusive analysis.187  
 
Yet, in considering whether content blocking systems respect the CJEU’s case-law, another 
important point to note is that whilst according to Arnold J Cleanfeed ‘‘involves the first two 
levels of DPI analysis, but not the third’’ he is satisfied that ‘‘it is not necessary or 
appropriate to describe how it operates’’.188   
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Notably, Arnold J’s finding differs from Ofcom’s review which explains that packet 
inspection blocking measures can be applied at two levels: ‘‘shallow packet inspection’’ or 
more detailed level DPI.189 
 
How does Cleanfeed work? 
Although not being mentioned in Fox v BT190 it is worth pointing out that following Dr 
Clayton’s expert report Cleanfeed comprises a first stage filtering that resembles packet 
dropping. Notwithstanding, as Dr Clayton explains the major difficulty underlying packet 
dropping is the collateral damage that it produces because ‘‘all of the web content on the 
particular IP address will become inaccessible’’.191 
 
Interestingly, according to Dr Clayton, Cleanfeed works as follows: 
 
 ‘‘the first stage examines all traffic flowing from customers along... path... a... If the traffic is 
innocuous, then it is sent along path b to its destination in the normal way. If the traffic is for 
a suspect site, parts of which may be blocked, then it is redirected along path c to the second 
stage filter. This first stage selection of traffic is based on the examination of the destination 
port number and IP address within the packets. The second stage filtering is implemented as 
a web proxy that understands HTTP requests.’’192  
 
Crucially, in Golden Eye v Telefonica, Dr Clayton’s expert evidence is convincing enough to 
be admitted and relied upon by Arnold J himself.193 Indeed, Dr Clayton’s report is consistent 
with Ofcom’s review which makes it clear that ‘‘shallow packet inspection’’ can be defined 
as blocking based on the port, IP address and protocol combination ‘‘e.g. all traffic destined 
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 CopySense v Cleanfeed  
Moreover, it also has particular relevance to this section that in Fox v BT the High Court finds 
that SABAM v Scarlet195 does not contain any technical information related to how 
CopySense functions. However, Arnold J concludes, that pursuant to EMI v UPC196 his 
‘‘understanding is that it involves DPI with detailed, invasive analysis of the contents of data 
packets’’197 
Yet this is certainly interesting because in EMI v UPC the Irish High Court explains that 
CopySense works as follows:   
“It operates like an anti-virus programme in a sense that there is a database of signatures, in 
the case of CopySense signatures of copyright media… It does not monitor the contents of 
email, web travel, instant messaging, FDP, newsgroups, legal copyrights works being 
downloaded etc.”198 
 
Thus far, an important point to note here is that Ofcom’s review clarifies that as opposed to 
DPI devices which analyse the contents of the packet for features or values it is possible 
employing ‘‘shallow packet inspection’’ technology to gain access to other facilities, ‘‘such 
as e-mail or FTP, at the blocked site’’.199 
 
Taken together, as shown below, Charleton J’s finding and Ofcom’s review reveal that in 
SABAM v Scarlet200 and SABAM v Netlog201 the CJEU found the use of CopySense’s 
‘‘shallow packet inspection’’ to be tantamount to a general monitoring obligation - which is 
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Unblocking the DEA from the CJEU perspective 
Monitoring all electronic communications  
Firstly, in Fox v BT Arnold J finds that the injunction sought by the studios ‘‘does not 
require’’ BT to perform ‘‘active monitoring’’ as understood in L’Oréal v eBay202 by the 
CJEU ‘‘but simply to block’’ Newzbin2.203 However, it could be reasonably contended that 
alternative conclusions might be drawn taking into account the same CJEU jurisprudence. 
 
It is true that following the CJEU L’oreal v eBay the third sentence of Article 11 of Directive 
2004/48/EC along with Article 18 of Directive 2000/31/EC permit domestic courts to require 
an online service provider to adopt measures that not only result in terminating 
contraventions, but also in precluding further violations.204  
 
On the other hand, it has been shown earlier that according Dr Clayton’s expert report, 
Cleanfeed’s first stage filtering ‘‘examines all traffic flowing from customers’’.205 
Notwithstanding, the main difficulty underlying packet dropping is the collateral damage that 
it produces because ‘‘all of the web content on the particular IP address will become 
inaccessible’’.206  
 
Or put differently, as the CJEU found in SABAM v Scarlet: 
 
‘‘In the present case, the injunction requiring the installation of the contested filtering system 
involves monitoring all the electronic communications made through the network of the 
ISP.’’207  
 
Accordingly, in line with the CJEU, it must be concluded that the injunction can no longer be 
deemed to respect the fair balance between copyright protection, and the freedom for ISP’s to 
conduct their business (Promusicae v Telefonica208).209 
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 Thus, the first lesson that can be learnt from this paper is that for content blocking systems, 
such as, Cleanfeed to adequately strike the Promusicae balance one might debate that these 
filters should be devised to prevent the screening of ‘‘all’’ electronic communications.  
 
Infringing the fundamental rights of ISP’s clients 
Secondly, in Fox v BT Arnold J is satisfied that consistent with L’Oréal v eBay210 the 
injunction sought does ‘‘not involve detailed inspection of the data’’ of any of BT’s 
clients.211 Nevertheless, again it is worth emphasising that pursuant to the CJEU in SABAM v 
Scarlet212 and SABAM v Netlog213 the conclusion drawn here would be different.   
 
As described above, Dr Clayton explains that Cleanfeed’s first stage filtering is based on the 
inspection of the IP address and destination port number. On the other hand, the second stage 
is carried out as a web proxy that reads HTTP requests.214 
 
Accordingly, as the CJEU correctly stresses, the impact of that injunction would not be 
restricted to the ISP involved, since the disputed blocking system might likewise violate the 
fundamental freedoms of that ISP’s clients.215 
 
Put another way: 
‘‘... first... the injunction… would involve a systematic analysis of all content and the 
collection and identification of users’ IP addresses from which unlawful content on the 
network is sent. Those addresses are protected personal data… Secondly, that injunction 
could potentially undermine freedom of information since that system might not distinguish 
adequately between unlawful content and lawful content, with the result that its introduction 
could lead to the blocking of lawful communications.’’216  
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Indeed, despite Arnold J’s finding above in L’oreal v eBay the CJEU held that under Article 3 
of Directive 2004/48/EC the court granting the injunction needs to guarantee that the 
measures ‘‘do not create barriers to legitimate trade.’’217  
 
Therefore, the second lesson that can be learnt from this paper is that for content blocking 
systems like Cleanfeed to conform to the CJEU’s case-law they should also be designed 
taking into account the fundamental freedoms of the ISP’s clients. 
 
Carrying out general monitoring  
Thirdly, in Fox v BT the High Court finds that considering BT’s level of monitoring, the 
monitoring obligation ‘‘is specific rather than general’’.218 Regrettably, the fact still remains, 
however, that another conclusion could be drawn from the same CJEU case-law. 
 
There is no doubt that Article 18 of Directive 2000/31/EC compels Member States to ensure 
the quick implementation of measures intended not only to confront present but also future 
intellectual property infringement.219 Notwithstanding, in L’oreal v eBay the CJEU also adds 
that these conditions need to observe the exceptions emanating from Directive 2004/48.220 
 
As discussed above, consistent with Dr Clayton, Cleanfeed’s first stage analyses ‘‘all traffic’’ 
originating from clients. If the traffic is harmless, then it is directed to its destination. 
Nevertheless, if the traffic is from a suspicious website, elements of which might be filtered, 
then it is diverted to the second stage.221  
Accordingly, following SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog it is arguable that Cleanfeed 
would therefore be required to: 
First, ‘‘identify’’, the files that are likely to include copyright protected works. Secondly, 
‘‘determine’’ which of these files are being kept and made publicly available illegally, and 
thirdly, ‘‘prevent’’ files deemed to be illegal from being made available.222 
As the CJEU elaborates:  
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‘‘Preventive monitoring of this kind would thus require active observation of files... and 
would involve almost all of the information thus stored.’’223 
Thus, ‘‘it follows that that injunction would require… to carry out general monitoring, 
something which is prohibited by Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31.’’224  
Resultantly, the third lesson that can be learnt from this paper is that for Cleanfeed’s 
implementation not to result in general monitoring being performed again, these filters should 
arguably be created to evade ‘‘active observation’’ of content.  
 
Blocking measures inconsistency with article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31 
This section has analysed whether in light of the CJEU case-law the power to make provision 
about injunctions preventing access to internet locations strikes the right balance between the 
interests of copyright holders and those of ISPs, site operators and users. In Fox v BT Arnold 
J finds that the order sought by the studios does not require BT to perform active monitoring 
but merely to block Newzbin2.225 However, as the CJEU in SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v 
Netlog suggests, irrespective of how specifically monitoring is carried out, no shallow packet 
inspection device will ever be able to distinguish in an absolutely foolproof way between 
licensed and unlicensed content.226 Thus one of the most significant findings to emerge from 
this paper is that under Article 15(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC the implementation of content 
blocking systems like Cleanfeed is certainly likely to result in a prohibited act, namely, 
carrying out general monitoring. Consequently, another significant practical implication of 
this section is that in view of SABAM v Scarlet and SABAM v Netlog once more the UK could 
be in breach of European case-law. Therefore, no matter how sections 17 and 18 of the DEA 
are implemented, the main conclusion to be drawn from the above discussion is that pursuant 
to the CJEU’s jurisprudence the blocking of legitimate speech would fail to strike the right 
balance between the interests of content owners and those of ISPs, site operators and users.   
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OBSERVATIONS 
Leaving aside the original contribution that this paper adds to the creation of new knowledge 
regarding the compatibility of any blocking measure with article 10 of the ECHR, the major 
weakness inherent in this study concerns the method of data collection.  
 
As discussed in the introduction, in February 2011, Jeremy Hunt asked Ofcom to assess 
whether sections 17 and 18 of the DEA could be effectively implemented. Notwithstanding, 
in May 2011, Ofcom concluded that the site blocking provisions would be ineffective.227  
 
Therefore, following Ofcom’s review this paper demonstrates why the UK’s government’s 
decision to abandon site-blocking plans appears appropriate. However, apart from judicial 
decisions, legislation, administrative law and independent expert evidence this study provides 
virtually no other relevant information to reach such a conclusion.  
As Max Rowlands notes, Hunt’s decision generated optimism among some detractors of the 
DEA. Nevertheless, in a matter of weeks The Guardian reported that the UK Minister for 
Cuture Ed Vaizey begun secret negotiations with content owners and ISPs to draft The 
Potential for a Voluntary Code228 - a proposal for a new website-blocking scheme.229  
Rowlands argues that the UK government’s decision to drop site-blocking plans does not 
reflect a changing attitude towards online censorship. Instead the established precedent under 
section 97A of the CDPA has provided them with the opportunity to drop sections 17 and 18 
of the DEA without enraging the copyright industry which has exerted strong pressure for its 
introduction.230  
However, whether the UK government’s decision will eventually result in such contentious 
provisions being removed from the DEA remains to be seen. Indeed, this is particularly so 
when the Voluntary Code recognises that ‘‘a voluntary self-regulatory solution – if fully 
effective – could largely supplant the need for S17/18 DEA, which should nevertheless be 
implemented.’’231  
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 Thus far, after Next Steps for Implementation of the DEA232 in August 2011, the final step in 
the creation of the new voluntary scheme was in January 2012 when the UK government 
released Responsible Practices for Search Engines in Reducing Online Infringement 
Proposal for a Code of Practice.233 
 
Accordingly, the introduction of yet another website-blocking code suggests that search 
engines should, inter alia: 
 remove contravening links within a ‘‘maximum of 4 hours’’; and 
 ensure an ‘‘expedited process’’ which permits quick removal and blocking of 
contravening links.234 
Or put differently, in the same way as in the Voluntary Code235 the above measures involve 
expedited blocking without judicial oversight or due process of any kind.  
 
To do so, and what makes this even more worrying is that among other things search engines 
should carry out ‘‘active, ongoing, effective screening’’.236 In other words, under Article 
15(1) of Directive 2000/31/EC the implementation of the new voluntary scheme could again 
result in a prohibited act, namely, imposing a general monitoring obligation upon search 
engines.   
Consequently, although most of the findings presented in this paper are robust, the ones in 
support of the UK government’s decision to abandon site-blocking plans are at best 
disputable, and at worst no longer sustainable.   
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